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Introduction
With the inclusion of Greece in 2001,
the Eurozone had grown to twelve member
countries, all of which had accepted a uniform
monetary policy that was not consistently ben-
eficial to all members. Individual currencies
allow modern countries to lend with country-
specific exchange and interest rates. Exchange
rates and interest rates fluctuate with economic
success and failure. Under the euro, countries
no longer experience this natural symbiosis, and
instead have a single monetary policy regulated
by the conditions of the largest economy 
in the union, which most frequently has been
Germany. Simultaneously with German pros-
perity, the economies of most European coun-
tries were crumbling and falsifying account-
ing records to hide the dire situations that
became commonplace.
In Greece, the sovereign debt crisis stemmed
from historical social and political problems,
many of which originate in the Greek culture.
Over the past 200 years, Greek social norms
have come to include federal tax fraud, abuse of
the pension system, and a reliance on a social-
istic public sector, all of which were masked
by deceptive accounting practices. German,
French, and domestic Greek banks were sig-
nificant lenders to Greece, enabling its debt cri-
sis. The situation was not unique to Greece,
either, as German and French banks were also
significant lenders to Italy, Spain, and Portugal.
As Greek bonds lost investor confidence from
2009 to 2011, doubt began to spread to the other
weak Eurozone economies and in turn to lend-
ing financial institutions. The creation of a cur-
rency union without a core fiscal union had
formed an economic abscess in the roots of an
innovative, regional financial authority. Now,
the financial decisions and interactions among
the lead Eurozone economies will have endur-
ing consequences on world economies and
financial markets. 
THE GREEK DEBT CRISIS AND 
ITS IMPACT ON EUROZONE
SOVEREIGN DEBT
Brian Berzin
A History of Greek Default
Beginning with its independence in the
1820s, Greece has been habitually in default
or cut off from external capital markets. Greece’s
reputation in global capital markets has been
built on a long and distressed history, which
often resulted in higher borrowing rates to com-
pensate for the increased risk of default.
Historical yields on ten-year Greek bonds
show that rates have been influenced by
increased risk premiums as well as significant
global economic events, including recessions,
sovereign credit crises in other countries, and,
most significantly, the acceptance of Greece into
the EU. Risk premiums, or increased rates
required by investors, adjust for increased
likelihood of default. Risk premiums compen-
sate for the occasional default of a debtor, cov-
ering losses with the increased returns on
debt issues. The risk of default for highly rated
countries is minimal. If a country’s probability
of default increases, its credit rating falls and its
risk premium rises. An extremely low “junk”
credit rating signals a near-default scenario and
has a very high implied yield to compensate
for the increased default risk. When Greece
entered the EU, however, its risk premium
fell, in part due to the falsified historical debt
levels used to gain admittance. Greece’s status
as a new EU member also lulled global creditors
into a false sense of Greek economic security
and stability.
European Union Membership & Early
Evidence of a Sovereign Debt Crisis
The EU’s 1993 Maastricht Treaty estab-
lished specific requirements for EU countries
adopting the euro. The treaty established rig-
orous economic ratio benchmarks including
inflation, annual deficit and debt ratios, and
interest rates. Thereafter, a single document
would uniformly regulate economies across the
EU. Individual countries within the EU, how-
ever, are not all the same: The massive German
economy, based on strong exports, cannot be
compared to Greece, which has an economy
based on tourism and a shipping industry
that pays no tax revenue into the Greek econ-
omy. Even before Greece’s induction to the
Eurozone in 2001, problems were already
brewing, both inside the existing EU and
within the Greek government.
In “The Euro-Descent into Hell,” Ger-
man economist Wilhelm Nölling described the
follies of a single currency union used by many
different nations, each with its own fiscal pol-
icy. Different countries had different motives for
joining the economic venture. Germany, for
instance, saw a huge trade opportunity. With the
creation of a single European currency, Ger-
many consistently grew its economy from the
amplified trade and uniform currency, and its
GDP increased steadily. The increased German
exports also meant that Germany was in essence
exporting unemployment to many other parts
of the EU. In many countries, German imports
infringed significantly on what had previously
been domestic spending. Other, smaller coun-
tries, such as Greece, gained tremendous oppor-
tunities to obtain cheaper capital, as well as
increased tourism, from the euro area. As a
result of entrance into the Eurozone, many
countries saw new opportunities for foreign
direct investments.
Although the reasoning for countries
entering the EU varied, many countries faced
similar hurdles to meet Maastricht Treaty
requirements. The various treaties and agree-
ments that hold the EU together, however, are
vague regarding accounting standards and
transactions that fall under regulated debt lev-
els. Financial reporting of deficit levels for
Spain, Greece, and Portugal were crafted to
meet EU standards where necessary, without
accurately accounting for the real levels of debt
and budget deficits. This common practice,
though apparent from the beginning, had not
impacted sovereign borrowing until mid-2000.
In 1996, an EU summit discussed fines for
not adhering to the EU economic conditions,
which included a set of legal penalties dubbed
as “a paper tiger” by Willem Buiter, former chief
economist at Citigroup (Forelle and Fidler). The
actual rules, regulations, and policies were inef-
fective at regulating EU countries. Although the
infamous “Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis” gained
global notoriety just in 2009, a long paper
trail was evident as early as 2001 to observant
investors. As Michael Lewis observes in his book
Boomerang: Travels in the New Third World, the
few people who realized the start of the global
financial crisis and understood its causes could
24
profit through taking positions, instead of help-
ing solve the issues (p. 20).
In 2001, over $19 billion was lent to
Greece through currency swap derivatives
arranged by U.S. investment bank Goldman
Sachs (Dunbar and Martinuzzi). Due to the swap
listing as a derivative, Greece was able to keep
the debt “off the books” legally, which did not
impact EU regulation thresholds. One such deal,
called “Aeolos,” supplied Greece with funding in
exchange for annuities of payments by pub-
licly owned airports, and other derived cash
flows, until 2019 (Story et al.). Although Gold-
man Sachs and Greece did not receive wide-
spread public criticism for such deals until
the debt levels were unsustainable, a 2003
article in Risk magazine identified the deriva-
tive situation, which was also fully disclosed
in the Greek Parliament (Martinuzzi). In a
broader context, the $15 billion transaction, a
completely legal and common operation,
accounts for only a fraction of a percent of
Greece’s total debt, but both Goldman Sachs and
Greece were ultimately scorned. This transac-
tion was one of many that slowly accumu-
lated, veiled from traditional debt records. By
2005, even Goldman Sachs viewed the interest
rate swap with Greece as too risky and, to
avoid future exposure, Goldman Sachs sold
the remaining cash flow streams to the National
Bank of Greece at a discount (Story et al.).
Changes in accounting standards occa-
sionally uncovered some of the debt loopholes
frequently exploited by Greece as it prepared
to enter the EU. Eurostat, the EU’s statistical
information division, revised Greece’s historical
deficit levels in 2000 as Greece began talks to
enter the Eurozone. The new standards
increased the 1998 deficit from 2.5 percent to
3.2 percent (Forelle and Fidler). Three years
later, in 2004, the 1998 deficit levels were
revised, yet again, to include other buried sov-
ereign debt transactions of an additional $2.4
billion, to 4.3 percent. In retrospect, signs of the
Greek sovereign debt meltdown were readily dis-
cernable well before the country entered the
Eurozone. Similarly, the 2003 deficit levels, as
well as many other annual levels, were steadily
being revised by Eurostat, all the way to 5.7 per-
cent in 2005.
During the rule of PASOK (Greece’s social-
ist party, which ruled in much of the 1980s
and 1990s), Eurostat revised Greek budgets
from the previously reported surpluses to exten-
sive deficits. When Eurozone membership was
granted under the PASOK regime, it was not yet
obvious that the administration had misrepre-
sented the targeted economic benchmarks to
strengthen its case for acceptance. When PASOK
lost the 2004 election to Prime Minister Kostas
Karamanlis of the conservative New Democracy
Party, public debt levels were already at an
estimated 103 percent of GDP and growing
(“Timeline . . .”). Under Karamanlis, debt lev-
els were internally revised yet again to more
realistic levels, but debt such as the Goldman
Sachs transactions was still maintained off the
books as it was not considered sovereign debt
by the EU’s accounting standards. Greece fabri-
cated economic data every year as well, and
exploited accounting EU standards. National
defense and healthcare spending were almost
always misstated, and Eurostat revised Greek
statistics time and time again to reflect the true
amounts (Balzli). Billions in pension financ-
ing from sovereign debt sources were unac-
counted for in Greek debt levels (Lewis, p. 47).
The shady government transactions were
not unique to any one political regime; all
parties shared some degree of guilt. Under
Prime Minister Karamanlis and the New
Democracy Party, debt continued to grow
unregulated, and lenders continued to offer low
interest rates. In 2009, the New Democracy
Party was voted out of power, and back came
PASOK, a party that had contributed its share
to the damaging accumulation of sovereign
debt. Shortly after the elections, debt levels were
suddenly and drastically revised from a Euro-
zone-compliant 3 percent to a deficit higher
than 12 percent. By April 2010, Greece had to
appeal to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) for emergency funding to avoid default
(Strupczewski).
Many countries throughout the EU were
in similar sovereign debt situations, although
the spotlight was not yet on them. Visible evi-
dence of corruption and unsustainable debts was
overlooked, as were histories of default. Credi-
tors nonetheless continued to lend money
irresponsibly to Greece and other fiscally weak
EU countries, even without risk-adjusted rates
of return. These lenders eventually felt the neg-
ative impact, as credit was extended without the
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added compensation from adequate risk premi-
ums. Historical precedents for default no longer
were incorporated into the risk premiums on
sovereign debt issuances within the EU. Lenders
saw the EU as a single, strong economy, instead
of a collection of diverse economies. Greece
could borrow at the same rates as Germany
because lenders overlooked the risks involved.
European Trends in Government Debt
The lack of sovereign default by the 2000s
was one of the largest oversights in the finan-
cial history of modern civilization. After a
worldwide trend of normal defaults in the 1980s
and ’90s throughout South America and
Europe, the suddenly calm seas in the EU
were attributed to economic policy success.
In reality, as seen very clearly in hindsight,
Europe was just brewing a “hundred-year flood”
of defaults (Rogoff and Reinhart, p. xxviii). As
Germany continued efforts to unite Europe and
maintain yearly trade surpluses from a con-
nected euro economy, lending rates fell, and
risk premiums were abandoned. Governments
in Greece and Italy immediately took advantage
of the low borrowing rates and increased the
previously nonexistent long-term national
debts to unsustainable levels. Creditors contin-
ued to lend, ignoring all signs of a brewing sov-
ereign default crisis. 
Benefiting from the cheap Eurozone cap-
ital markets access, socialism flourished in
the less-developed southern European coun-
tries. The governments of Greece, Italy, and
Spain dumped the borrowed funds into pension
and unemployment funding, and promoted
an unsustainably high standard of living and
diminishing national incomes. Greece’s rev-
enue from tourism and a reliance on “import-
ing visitors” made up nearly one fifth of the
entire Greek economy (Karabell), and shipping
was not taxed. 
The Second Great Contraction
As the first decade of the new millennium
waned, global financial and economic mar-
kets entered unprecedented turmoil. The Sec-
ond Great Contraction began in the banking
industries of United States, Ireland, and Iceland.
Although this contraction was different from
the Eurozone sovereign debt calamity, eco-
nomic uncertainty spread, and doubt was cast
upon the stability of sovereign government debt
and currencies. 
German banks had participated in sub-
prime lending to American borrowers (Lewis, 
p. 147), and had to write off $25 billion when
the U.S. real estate market collapsed in 2007. As
the housing market and attached mortgage-
backed securities market fell, contagion spread
throughout the U.S. banking sector. In his 2011
speech in Jackson Hole, Ben Bernanke cited the
response of European leadership in arguing that
political paralysis had become the primary
obstruction to recovery (Rogoff, “Will The
IMF . . .”). The U.S. government took quick
action to address the growing predicament
and contain the impact on the banking sector.
To prevent a full-scale national banking crisis,
the U.S. government inadvertently increased the
risk of a debt crisis by resorting to deficit financ-
ing. A traditional post-collapse recession was
expected, but quick implementation of reforms
and bailouts provided some hope for a quick
recovery.
The connections among the sovereign
debt, banking, and currency crises are clearly
evident throughout the Second Great Con-
traction. Historically, a mix of sovereign debt,
fiscal stimulus, and monetary policy can
strengthen a frail economy and promote
growth. In the EU, however, the currency infu-
sion prevented fiscal and monetary policy from
being tailored to the specific needs of individual
countries, and new burdens of contagion within
the EU were cultivated. Germany also experi-
enced repeatedly poor risk management in its
lending practices and failed to identify risky
investments that would ultimately lead to
default. The results of German banks’ insuffi-
cient lending standards had already emerged in
their losses during the financial crises in the
United States, Ireland, and Iceland. The German
origination and underwriting of sovereign
debt to faltering countries within the EU (such
as Greece) continued. 
Due to banking meltdowns around the
world, foreign lending to Greece and other EU
countries diminished, and exports fell. Histor-
ically, as Rogoff and Reinhart observe in This
Time is Different, “banking crises in advanced
economies significantly drag down world
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growth” (p. 73), especially for countries in the
periphery. Refinancing the maturing debt of
Greece and Italy became increasingly hard,
and global capital markets quickly became more
risk averse.
A Loss of Confidence in Greek Debt
When the newly-elected Greek govern-
ment publicly announced the revised public
debt level of 127 percent of GDP in 2009, Greek
bond prices fell drastically and yields soared. The
IMF immediately moved in to aid Greece in
2010, which was suddenly cut off from exter-
nal capital markets (Stearns and van de Pol).
The IMF bailouts, however, were merely short-
term solutions that only delayed the inevitable
Greek default on debt. In late 2011, waves of IMF
funding would be awarded if certain government
benchmarks, including budgetary cuts, were
met. As Greece fell into economic contraction
following the 2009 outbreak, the government
was unable to make progress. It was reported
that, without the $10.8 installment in Sep-
tember 2011 of the total $161 billion IMF loan,
Greece would have fallen into default on its
interest payments as early as mid-October of
that year. 
In Greece, the IMF bailouts were very
unpopular. Greeks enjoyed their high quality of
life and were so accustomed to deficit spend-
ing that it had become an integral part of their
culture. Greek citizens did not realize fully how
unsustainable their policies had become, and
having foreigners tell them to cut back on the
spending that supported their quality of life was
not popular. Protests ensued, and both gov-
ernment rule and social norms failed to adapt.
Even though Greece was projected to collect
higher government tax revenues, restructuring
the overburdened public sector was much more
costly than originally anticipated by foreign and
IMF authorities. Future policies will most likely
continue to be unpopular as changes in the pen-
sion and tax systems need to increase revenues.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) contin-
ued to decline through 2011, and Greek GDP
had diminished by 12 percent since 2008. By
the third quarter of 2011, Greek bond prices
indicated a near certainty of default. The 2011
deficit was continually revised throughout
the year, eventually reaching 8.5 percent of
GDP because the recession was deeper than
expected. As each wave of bailout funding
approached, market volatility grew in succes-
sion, thus enabling U.S. and European markets
to regain traction each time funding was
secured (Wagner and Levy). The volume of
Greek bonds traded had also shrunk to very low
levels. Similar to U.S. Federal Reserve debt,
where primary dealers are required to make a
market, banks were required to make a mar-
ket for Greek debt. To compensate for this risk,
three-year Greek debt traded at 172 percent
yields, including a bid-offer spread (the differ-
ence between the price at which a dealer is will-
ing to sell and the price at which a dealer is will-
ing to buy) for bank involvement of 47 percent
(Oakley). No one wanted to touch the flag-
ging and illiquid Greek bond market even
before talk of outright default began. In com-
parison, bond yields on Belize debt jumped to
only 17.15 percent in 2006 as the country
teetered on default, nowhere near the unprece-
dented Greek bond yields (Barden).
The IMF and European leaders were drag-
ging out the Greek crisis much longer than any
historical default scenario while they attended
to the well-being of their own respective coun-
tries. By 2010, all global markets had been
affected by the Greek crisis; even gold and sil-
ver hit record levels. In terms of market value,
Greek debt became almost worthless in 2011. If
European banks had marked their positions to
market, similar to the way U.S. banks had
done during the U.S. financial crisis, many
financial institutions would have collapsed
instantaneously (Rappaport). Instead of mark-
ing to market, European banks slowly purged
their balance sheets of Greek sovereign debt.
Throughout the political contraventions
and constant debate on policy, both bond yields
and Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) accurately
depicted a borderline 98 percent probability of
default by September 2011 (Moses)1. Prices on
Greek CDS rose to roughly 4,000 basis points
(equal to 100 basis points per percentage point)
(Oakley). On top of the high price, institutions
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1
A CDS is a derivative which allows investors to
hedge against certain credit events (such as European sov-
ereign default) without holding an underlying insurable
interest. In default, the issuer covers some or all of the loss
of the CDS purchaser, similar to the payoff of an insur-
ance contract.
were required to pay 57 percent up front of the
money insured against Greek sovereign debt.
Further mitigating the risks of Greek default
at this point in time was almost impossible.
Ownership of Greek Debt
Domestic credit continues to tighten
around Greek banks. Similar to prior U.S. and
Icelandic financial crises, deposits and faith in
the banking system have sharply declined.
Although not often mentioned in the media,
Greek banks face dramatic capital risks due to
the decline in deposits in addition to their large
holdings of Greek sovereign debt.
Based on 2010 year-end financial data from
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
Greek banks held somewhere between $65 bil-
lion and $78 billion of government bonds
(Groendahl). National Bank of Greece officials
insisted that banking exposure to sovereign debt
was minimal and Greek banks were not highly
involved in the lending. According to the Bank
of Greece’s 2010 International Investment Posi-
tion report, external liabilities of the govern-
ment totaled $193 billion, with $50 billion
also indebted to the IMF Bailout agreement
(Bank of Greece . . .). Unable to write off debt
without defaulting, publicly traded Greek banks
held similar Greek sovereign levels at the end of
2011, which were also used to meet reserve
requirements. Greek pension funds held almost
$40 billion in sovereign debt. 
Greek banks and pension funds are the
largest owners of sovereign debt, with Ger-
man and French banks and pension funds not
far behind. In April 2010, Germany held $38 bil-
lion of sovereign debt, according to IMF data
(Ewing). By the end of 2011, IMF figures showed
that German ownership fell to somewhere
between high and low estimates of $34 billion
and $22.7 billion, respectively (Groendahl). At
the end of 2011 it was noted that French banks
also had significant holdings, with roughly
$57 billion total (“Eurozone Crisis . . .”). Many
banks were forced to reduce their exposures,
often by writing off bad debt, and eventually
through sales to the ECB, which held $65 bil-
lion in junk-grade Greek sovereign debt by 2012
(Groendahl).
In Q3 2011, BNP Paribas SA and Societe
Generale SA wrote off over $3.1 billion when
selling portions of their Greek sovereign debt in
the face of record losses, credit downgrades, and
tumbling stock prices. Although write offs and
losses were being proactively absorbed on Greek
debt, low investor confidence was evident in the
stock markets. In January 2011, Standard and
Poor’s downgraded France from AAA to AA+
as debt contagion and market volatility had
already spread throughout Europe to shake
investor confidence (Weismann et al.). In the
author’s interviews with American investment
bankers, a common lack of trust in French
and German banking statistics was evident; U.S.
bankers consistently pointed out “flaky” Euro-
pean bank accounting practices and flagrant fab-
rication of high ratios. If Greece were to default
outright on its sovereign debt, French and Ger-
man banks would be noticeably impacted, and
quite possibly face collapse themselves.
A European Stalemate
The Greek economy was dependent on
capital inflows from other EU counties. As cheap
debt was no longer available or even rolled over,
the IMF and ECB moved to bail Greece out. His-
torically, fiscal and monetary policy could be
used to combat lack of funding, but due to the
Eurozone treaties, monetary policy could not be
tailored specifically to each country. When
countries are heading toward default, mone-
tary policy can be used to devalue their cur-
rencies, eliminating debt to some extent. Cur-
rency devaluation beyond a certain limit is
not beneficial, however, and can end up hurting
the economy more than it helps. At the limit
of currency devaluation, the government’s
excessive printing of money puts the actual
value far below the amount of revenue the
government could collect through taxes at lower
inflationary levels. A theoretical balance can
be met by printing a sufficient sum of cur-
rency to eliminate debts and stimulate exports,
while not overly debasing the currency through
inflation.
Unlike companies, countries do not sim-
ply default and go into bankruptcy. As Rogoff
and Reinhart observe, “Country default is often
the result of a complex, cost-benefit calculus
involving social and political considerations, not
just economic and financial ones” (p. 51). The
cost-benefit analysis of default is unique to each
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individual country. When a monetary union is
ancillary, the complexity only multiplies. In the
current situation the fate of not only Greece, but
the entire EU economy, is being decided by
the most powerful players: Germany and France.
Nonetheless, enforcement power by these coun-
tries remains limited. Sovereign debt is issued
by each nation’s individual government, and
therefore each government can assess its
options and make its own default decisions. Out-
right default is usually avoided as often as
possible, and Greek history shows that default
leads to long spans of isolation from capital mar-
kets and very expensive future borrowing. An
outright default would limit Greece’s ability to
pay for its basic necessity imports from other
countries.
Because they held so much Greek sover-
eign debt, Germany and France also had good
reason to avoid a Greek default. In a way, they
were bailing themselves out. The current Ger-
man Chancellor Angela Merkel and then French
President Nicolas Sarkozy were committed to
saving Greek sovereign debt at almost any price.
European leaders saw the issue in a very slanted
way: Greece would use bailout funds to pay off
its debt, much of which was owed to Germany
and France. Unfortunately, the Greek prob-
lems were based in social, political, and cultural
traditions, and the bailout was just throwing
good money at bad money in an attempt to
buy political reform. German and French offi-
cials did not want to let Greece default, as
their own banks would have suffered the most,
and Merkel and Sarkozy were doing every-
thing in their power to get all European coun-
tries to pay for their own bank failures and poor
lending decisions (Schuman).
At a certain cost-benefit point that the
European community was approaching, the
funds needed from the EU to buy political and
social reform far outweighed the benefits of sav-
ing Greece. In a traditional country with its own
currency, the cost-benefit analysis would be
much different, and the risk of contagion and
monetary devaluation for other countries would
be lessened. The monetary euro union also
restricted Greece’s available options for avoid-
ing default; Greece could not fund itself through
inflation and currency devaluation.
In the EU, exchange rates remained rela-
tively constant without any ECB stabilizers from
2007 to 2010, even though many member coun-
tries were faltering. In 2007, while the U.S.
financial sector was crumbling and the U.S. dol-
lar weakened, the euro was seen as a much safer
currency comparatively, and this perception
lulled investors into a false sense of security.
Many American hedge funds accurately gauged
the oncoming risks in the euro and began sell-
ing it as fast as possible. Many hedge fund man-
agers were shocked when euro prices did not
plummet, as China had been buying up the
fire sale of euro currency. With its excess
reserves and already heavy reliance on the
U.S. dollar, China was purchasing the euro with-
out assessing the future risks associated with
the currency. A new complacency was brought
to the ECB and Eurozone, which made them
believe their currency was the safest in the
world. As the sovereign debt contagion spread
to Italy and Spain in January 2012, the euro
began to show signs of strain, and exchange
rates against the dollar fell to a record 16-month
low of $1.28 (David).
Contagion
Although European authorities were cor-
rect when they judged Greece’s sovereign debt
not large enough to threaten the EU’s existence,
Greece’s situation was a big enough part to
threaten the stability of larger European coun-
tries that were also overburdened with debt.
These larger debtors could potentially ruin
the EU and euro currency. Greece accounted for
only approximately 5 percent of European sov-
ereign debt, at $400 billion. Spain, plagued with
a 20 percent unemployment rate, trumped
Greece’s sovereign debt in 2010 with a total of
$800 billion. Spanish banks also held Por-
tuguese sovereign debt of approximately $35 bil-
lion in 2010, with equal portions also being held
by French and German banks (Groendahl).
Italy, the third largest economy in the
Eurozone, has approximately $2.6 trillion in
national debt (20 percent of EU sovereign debt),
and is teetering on the edge of a debt crisis as
well. Italy needs to gain an additional $520
billion in short term debt in 2012 to roll over
interest payments (Walker et al.). As shown in
historical debt levels dating back to 1995, Italy’s
debt-to-GDP was unsustainably high, and this
trend was intrinsic in the high government
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bond yields. A uniform trending decrease in
bond yields and reduction of risk premiums
occurred as the EU formed and as a false sense
of economic stability was created.
If the exposure to Greek debt was not large
enough to topple just about every French or
German bank, a default by either Spain or
Italy would have been more than enough to
ensure a massive banking crisis. Almost instan-
taneously the ECB would also have become
insolvent, and the euro would have undoubtedly
fallen. The European Central Bank, the con-
troller of the euro’s monetary policy (and fit-
tingly ruled by the Germans), also remained
at an elevated risk, as it was overlooked by EU
political leaders. The ECB itself held over $60
billion in Greek sovereign debt, as well as
holdings from bond exchanges with many of
Europe and Greece’s larger banks, aimed at solv-
ing capital problems. If Greece were to default,
the banks would have owed the ECB the bond
values, which could create insolvency in both
the original banks as well as the ECB (Lewis,
p. 143).
Many knowledgeable investors realized
the risks of European sovereign debt well in
advance and took positions in Credit Default
Swaps (CDSs). According to the Depository
Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), CDSs
referencing Greece sovereign debt total approx-
imately $8 billion. Italy, Spain, and Portuguese
CDSs totaled upwards of $50 billion at the
beginning of 2010, well before any media or
ECB attention focused on these countries.
The Greek CDS market remains relatively small
and would be unable to collapse a systemati-
cally important institution, but if larger sov-
ereign defaults occur, the underwriters of CDSs
may also fall into financial trouble, similar to
the AIG collapse in 2008 (Davidson). Although
the unregulated CDS market has only fallen
apart once, its existence is still measured in
decades. Before it is too late, strong and defin-
itive market regulations and clearinghouses
should be established.
By late 2011, the EU and ECB formu-
lated a second bailout plan with a much broader
scope. European policymakers finally realized
that the Greek sovereign debt crisis had vast
implications beyond Greece; by putting off the
problem for four years, the leaders of the Euro-
zone had allowed the entire monetary union
to become infected. Merkel and Sarkozy were
not prudent in their new plan for Europe, which
still centered on the fact that, ultimately, French
and German banks were the main benefactors
of the bailouts, which would result in a grave
situation in the case of outright default. In his
2011 editorial “The Euro’s PIG-Headed Mas-
ters,” Ken Rogoff observed, “Instead of restruc-
turing the manifestly unsustainable debt bur-
dens of Portugal, Ireland, and Greece (the PIGs),
politicians and policymakers are pushing for
ever-larger bailout packages with ever-less real-
istic austerity conditions. Unfortunately, they
are not just ‘kicking the can down the road,’ but
pushing a snowball down a mountain.”
The Second European Bailout
At the heart of the new bailout, the same
social and political reform problems in Greece
remain, and futile austerity measures con-
tinue to be forced upon the corrupt and con-
tracted Greek economy. In spite of the first IMF
Emergency Bailout package in 2010, little
progress had been made by the end of 2011. Tax
reform failed to bring any real gains in revenue,
and the pension system continued at unsustain-
able levels. The original IMF and ECB bailout of
Greece can be called a failure. The European
authorities did not act quickly to contain the
Greek sovereign debt crisis, which spread like
a wildfire across southern Europe. Austerity and
political reform required by the second bailout
have continued to squander valuable funding.
A large part of the new bailout was based
on a proposed 60 percent debt haircut, or vol-
untary forgiveness by Greek sovereign debt
creditors. When the plan was announced in late
2011, reassured markets quickly became less
volatile, as investors believed progress was
finally being realized. Over the next six months,
extending into 2012, creditors would discuss the
proposed controlled default, which would avoid
the CDS triggers and aim to contain the crisis
from spreading to other weak Eurozone
economies.
According to Angela Merkel in a January
2012 news conference, “The Eurozone’s first
obligation this year is to resolve a second Greek
program and finalize these negotiations with
the banks so that we can then concentrate on
structural problems in the Eurozone” (Brown
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and Hudson). Merkel also pointed out that
she admired Italy for its quick new governmen-
tal reforms, as Italy moved into position to
try to save itself from the Eurozone’s growing
debt infection. Merkel and Sarkozy proclaimed
that the second Greek bailout package must
be set first, before other European sovereign
issues could be considered. Investors lacked
reassurance, and shortly after the plan’s
announcement European bond yields rose back
to record levels and reflected the still dire
nature of the situation.
In spite of the political motivations
throughout Europe, many educated voices
around the world spoke up and pointed out that
Greek debt will remain un-payable and threat-
ening to the well-being of all European coun-
tries. “Greece should default . . . you can’t jump
over a chasm in two steps,” said Mario Blejer,
former controller of Argentina’s Central Bank
after its 2001 default of $95 billion, the largest
sovereign default in modern history (Raszewski
and Russo).
It soon became clear that, as with the
first bailout, efforts to balance Greece’s budget
had made little progress, and Greek unem-
ployment exceeded 18 percent (Granitsas et al.).
The Greek economy was in a clear contraction
due to gross mismanagement and inefficient
regulation. Nevertheless, EU and Greek author-
ities assured the public that everything was fine.
A Greek official in the Finance Ministry pro-
claimed on January 12, 2012, “We are com-
pletely on track. Exploiting the momentum,
by the end of the next week we could have the
final outline for a deal with the private sector”
(“Final Outline of . . .”).
The outlined deal would cut Greece’s total
sovereign debt from over $450 billion to $330
billion, while reducing yearly interest service
by $7 billion a year. Much of the $330 billion
would also be exchanged for increased matu-
rities of up to 30 years, and minimal coupons
of less than 5 percent, half of current Italian
debt interest rates. Even before a formal offer-
ing had been reached by some creditors, many
others, including Vega Asset Management
hedge fund, had ceased talks and left the steer-
ing committee to negotiate the agreement with
Greece (Wilkes). Sarkozy and Merkel devised
a 60 percent haircut on their own accord, and
a poorly disguised traditional sovereign default
was crafted through painstaking private nego-
tiations with creditors. The steering fund com-
mittee, made up mostly of large French, Ger-
man, and Greek banks, was created to abide
by the voluntary debt forgiveness guidelines
originally proposed. Vega Asset Management
was just one voice on the board, but many other
hedge funds have significant positions in sov-
ereign debt markets that could topple bond
markets if intentionally pushed in the wrong
direction (Wilkes and White). The simple fact
remains, however, that creditors can reduce
debt on a voluntary basis only. If enough cred-
itors fail to accept, debt will be reduced only
in small amounts, and Greece would still
default when the debt matured. In Ken Rogoff’s
editorial, “A Gravity Test for the Euro,” he
argues “[The proposed] haircut for private-sec-
tor holders of Greek sovereign debt is not suf-
ficient to stabilize that country’s profound debt
and growth problems.”
By March 20, 2012, more Greek sover-
eign debt, totaling $20 billion, would mature,
requiring additional bailout support to avoid
default (“Greece nears . . .”). As of January 2012,
Greece had received $97 billion from the orig-
inal IMF bailout, and will receive another $120
billion regardless of the level of debt forgiveness
over the next 12 months.
The private sector involvement in the debt
forgiveness plan was based on bond holders’
individually accepting conditions and taking a
voluntary cut of their debt holdings, which
was unprecedented in the history of sovereign
default. Time and time again over the past seven
hundred years, countries have exercised the
ability to restructure debt by altering and
amending laws and regulations. Creditors might
own the originally issued three-year bonds, and
would have no recourse if the government
decided to restructure their investment into ten-
year maturities. In these scenarios, a default
does occur, and the country’s credit rating
plummets, impacting future borrowing, but the
cost-benefit decision of default reveals that
this is the best available option. In the case of
Greece at the beginning of 2012, the scenario
and cost-benefit analysis are exactly the same.
A controlled default and extension of bonds
for even ten years would allow Greece the crit-
ical time needed for fundamental political and
social reform. Protests would ease; the coun-
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try would be in economic recession, but its
course would be definitive.
Significant social, political, and auster-
ity programs still need to be implemented, or
the Greek people will experience devastating
consequences as their country regresses to
the level of a developing nation. Greek CDSs
would be triggered, but global financial mar-
kets would be able to absorb the impacts, while
the Eurozone could concentrate on the much
larger issues at hand and solve the problems
that could otherwise crash financial markets
and credit around the world. In addition to
preparing for an imminent Greek default, the
Eurozone and stronger economies must imple-
ment sturdy firewalls to keep Spanish and
Italian debt from contagion.
The Failure of the Euro
A monetary union without a consistent
fiscal union, such as the EU, was formed in
a period of economic growth without suffi-
cient contemplation of what might happen in
the case of economic contraction and sover-
eign default of member countries. Eurozone
leaders failed to consider the world history
of sovereign default and banking default and
allow for the implications of currency crises.
In a 2012 Reuters poll of 64 economists,
only ten believed that the Eurozone would
collapse before year-end (Shuman). It may be
in the best interest of Eurozone countries
to keep the euro intact until economies sta-
bilize. However, beyond the end of the current
European financial crisis, the Eurozone will
require alterations in order to advance and
avoid the emergence of different (but not new)
forms of economic anguish. The Eurozone
lacks a level financial playing field. Every
country must have a controllable fiscal and
monetary policy in order for world financial
markets to compensate for each country’s
unique economy.
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